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Die politische Ökonomie der
ASEAN-Wirtschaftsintegration und bilaterale
Freihandelsabkommen
Christopher M. Dent
Abstract
Der Zusammenhang zwischen ökonomischem Regionalismus und bilateralen Handelsabkommen
hat in den letzten Jahren an Bedeutung für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Südostasiens gewon-
nen. Regionale Integrationsprozesse auf der Makro-Ebene umfassen die ASEAN-Freihandelszone
AFTA, die Initiative für eine ASEAN-Integration (IAI)und die ASEAN-Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
(AEC). Dies wurde auf der Mikro-Ebene durch eine Regionalisierung (beispielsweise von Produk-
tionsnetzwerken) und auf der Meso-Ebene durch subregionale Projekte wie Wachstumsdreiecke
untermauert. Singapur und Thailand sind Wegbereiter bei der Unterzeichnung von bilateralen
Abkommen mit unterschiedlichen Partnern. Es wird die These vertreten, dass Freihandelsbilate-
ralismus bestimmte Schwierigkeiten bei der Gemeinschaftsbildung in Südostasien mit sich bringt.
Anders als gesamtregionale Projekte wie AFTA oder IAI bauen sie nicht auf den Prinzipien der
Inklusion und der Gleichheit der Interessen auf. Während wirtschaftliche Integration Realität ist,
bergen bilaterale Freihandelsabkommen die Gefahr, dass sie die Entwicklungsunterschiede in der
Region verbreitern und das Spannungspotenzial innerhalb der ASEAN vergrößern (Manuskript
eingereicht am 10.10.2006; zur Veröffentlichung angenommen am 20.12.2006)
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1 Introduction
Southeast Asia is at a critical juncture concerning the development of its regional
economic integration and matters pertaining to regional community-building gen-
erally. Various levels and manifestations of integration have transpired between
the region’s constituent parts over recent years. At the micro-level, business-
driven regionalization processes (e.g. the development of regional production
networks) have fostered closer economic interdependent linkages between South-
east Asian countries. This has provided an important foundation on which
meso-level (i.e. between business and government) integration initiatives have
been built, these being sub-regional projects such as ‘growth polygons’ and partial
scope trade agreements between sub-sets of countries within the region.
Finally, there are a number of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
macro-level projects at the apex of the region’s integrational agenda: the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA), Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and the ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC). All these developments are intra-regional focused,
arising within the region, yet Southeast Asia is also being drawn increasingly
into various extra-regional integration projects. These include broader regional
frameworks like ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit groupings that
have to date primarily centered in improving regional ﬁnancial governance in
the aftermath of the 1997/98 ﬁnancial crisis. In addition, ASEAN member states
– especially Singapore and Thailand – have developed bilateral FTA links with a
number of trade partners outside Southeast Asia (Japan, United States, India, and
various Paciﬁc American states), as well as ASEAN-level FTA links with China
and South Korea. This paper argues that of all these inter-related integrational
processes the relationship between the FTA bilateralism and Southeast Asia’s
efforts at regional community-building is the most problematic. It ﬁrst examines
various levels of Southeast Asia’s economic integration processes, as categorized
above, and then explores the international political economy of FTAs and ASEAN.
Therein, we consider the nature of the bilateralism – regionalism relationship
in Southeast Asia and will argue that bilateral FTAs work against objectives of
regional community-building.
2 Economic Integrational Developments in Southeast Asia
2.1 Historic and Contemporary Contexts
Southeast Asia has a long history of international economic integration. For
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centuries, the region’s trading communities had facilitated commerce between
China and the Indian sub-continent along the Straits of Malacca and other
sea-routes. Colonization by the Western powers then broadened the commercial
network into global-scale imperial trading systems. Most recently, foreign
multinational enterprises (MNEs) have forged new integrational links through
the development of regional production networks, whereby workforces and
organizations from different Southeast Asian countries are incorporated into
transnational divisions of labor. Added to this are various integrational initiatives
occurring through ASEAN, Southeast Asia’s prime regional organization that has
increasingly focused on regional economic affairs in the post-Cold War era.
2.2 Micro-Level Developments: Regionalization in Southeast Asia
Intra-regional trade in Southeast Asia accounts for around 20 percent of ASEAN
countries’ total trade. This may not appear that high a ﬁgure but a large share of
this derives from the regional production network (RPN) trade of MNEs. Unlike
Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia has a long history of “hosting” foreign capital.
After the colonial period, the next wave of inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) came from Japanese companies during the mid-1980s to early 1990s. The
1985 Plaza Accord was the main catalyst for this, whereby Japan agreed to
appreciate the value of the yen in order to reduce its trade surpluses with the
United States and European Community. Seeking a more competitive production
base for its manufacturing exports, Japanese companies relocated operations
from Japan to Southeast Asia, especially in labor-intensive industry activities such
as textiles, basic electronics and other lower-tech manufacturing. This helped
pave the way for other MNEs, mostly from the U.S. and Europe, to also increase
their investments in the region during the 1990s.
Improvements in infrastructural technologies and the techno-industrial ca-
pacity of Southeast Asian nations led to the development of more complex and
region-wide divisions of labor across an increasingly broad range of industry
sectors (Henderson et al 2002, Kimura et al 2004, Yun 2003). The development
of regional production networks was based on three fundamental determinants.
First, MNEs could more easily search for the most cost-effective means of pro-
ducing whole or component elements of products as more nations competed
with each other for production contracts. Second, MNEs look to identify the
competitive advantages of nations in the qualitative terms of specialist produc-
tion capabilities that other nations do not possess, e.g. auto-part production in
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Thailand. This is an organizing principle of RPNs and also closely relates to the
industrial district phenomenon in which nations develop dense supplier network
clusters that are geographically concentrated to serve and attract major assembly
ﬁrms. Regional production networks may be anchored in such locations with
international links to other nodes in the production chain. Third, the production
chain activities within an RPN may be dispersed in such a way that helps a
multinational ﬁrm spread corporate risk. Different production facilities within
the RPN may be devised to easily duplicate the work of other network nodes,
which is advantageous when disturbances (e.g. sudden inﬂated costs or a political
crisis) occur within one or more countries involved in the production network.
Although it is China that now attracts the largest inﬂows of manufacturing
FDI into the wider East Asia region, regional production networks still constitute
an important binding force between ASEAN economies and have contributed sig-
niﬁcantly to the general development of regionalization in Southeast Asia overall.
Moreover, this has provided an important micro-level foundation to regional
community-building through inter-agent socialization, business-to-business learn-
ing, economic interdependence and other coalescent effects. Drawing upon
the seminal work of Hurrell on regional studies, we may deﬁne the regional
community-building process as one whereby a region develops “into an active
subject with a distinct identity, institutionalised or informal actor capability,
legitimacy and structure of decision-making in relation with a more or less re-
sponsive regional civil society, transcending old state borders” (Hurrell 1995:466).
Notwithstanding ASEAN’s traditionally very low-key institutional approach to
fostering regionalism, this deﬁnition of regional community-building has become
an increasing approximation to ASEAN’s integrational ambitions.
2.3 Meso-Level Developments: Sub-Regional Projects in
Southeast Asia
In between micro-level regionalization (i.e. business-led integration) and macro-
level regionalism (i.e. state-led integration projects) are various meso-level
initiatives within Southeast Asia that are sub-regional in geographic formation.
These build on existing localized RPN foundations and other manifestations of
(sub-) regionalization, such as cross-border trade, and are combined with interna-
tional policy frameworks between sets of Southeast Asian countries designed to
further cultivate the above.
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2.3.1 First Phase Sub-Regionalism
This concerns the emergence of various “growth triangle” or “growth polygon”
projects during the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s, and typically incorporates
contiguous border areas from different nation-states participating in a symbiotic
development relationship. These sub-regional economic zones (SREZs) as we
shall collectively refer to them are founded on the exploitation of economic
complementarities between participating territories. The role of each territory
depends upon its comparative level of development, access to factor resources,
position in regional or global production networks and so on. Geographical
proximity remains a key advantage in operating sub-regionalized networks as
ﬂexible production systems particularly depend on a locality of suppliers that
have the capacity for “just-in-time” logistics. In this respect a key role for
governments (both local and national) is the development of infrastructural
linkages, which may be viewed as supportive public good investments designed
to help facilitate trans-border exchanges within the SREZ. This may therefore
involve the construction of new transport links, energy generation provision
and communication hubs and networks. Governments may also relax rules on
international commercial practices and factor mobility between participating
territories. Growth triangles and polygons are particularly prevalent in Southeast
Asia, and below are listed the region’s main SREZ projects:
• Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMSGT): founded in 1989,
linking Singapore to Indonesia’s Riau province and Malaysia’s Johor province.
• Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-
EAGA): established in 1992 and involving Eastern Malaysia, Brunei, Sulawesi,
Kalimantan, the Moluccas, West Papua and Mindanao.
• Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMTGT): centered on the
Straits of Malacca, an historic trading route, and established in 1993.
Taking the second of these as an illustration, the primary aims of the BIMP-
EAGA were to boost trade, tourism and investment in the sub-region based on
existing transborder business linkages and developing policy co-operation be-
tween member governments to further facilitate international business expansion
within the SREZ. Extra-regional “development partners” included the Northern
Territory of Australia, China, Japan, Asian Development Bank, and the German
Technical Cooperation Agency. However, progress in coalescing and developing
BIMP-EAGA economic activity has been relatively slow, mainly owing to the lack
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of infrastructural investment. A similar problem has beset the IMTGT project,
and the IMSGT – the most prominent growth triangle in Southeast Asia – has
become less of a priority for the Singapore government as the city-state has
recently become more interested in developing foreign industrial parks in China
and India (Dent 2002).
2.3.2 Second Phase Sub-Regionalism
The second phase of sub-regionalism has overlapped with the ﬁrst and is more con-
cerned with sub-regional groupings that incorporate whole national economies
rather than just parts of them. For example, the Greater Mekong Sub-region
(GMS) project was established in 1992 and brought together Myanmar, Cambodia,
China (Yunnan Province), Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in a joint natural resource-
based and infrastructure-based development project based on the Mekong river
zone. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) plays a key coordinating and funding
role in the project, and the GMS’s sub-regional diplomacy framework is relatively
well developed. The 1995 Mekong Agreement – the founding document of
the Mekong River Commission – lays out the basic principles, procedures and
organizational structure for a water resource regime, including the management
of the dry season water ﬂows. Within the GMS membership lies a further sub-
grouping headed by Thailand, this being the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), which emerged from a proposal
made by Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in April 2003 to develop
a sub-regional Economic Co-operation Strategy between Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos and Myanmar. At the inaugural ACMECS summit held in November 2003,
ﬁve priorities for sub-regional cooperation were laid out, namely: trade and in-
vestment facilitation; industrial and agricultural co-operation; transport network
development; tourism; and human resources development. The overarching aim
was to close development gaps among the four ASEAN countries, promoting
prosperity in the sub-region in a sustainable manner. A framework of 46 common
projects and 224 bilateral projects were listed for implementation over a 10-year
program. Vietnam joined the ACMECS project in May 2004 and international
development partners comprise Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore and the
European Union.
Other sub-regional country groupings involving ASEAN member states in-
clude the Bangkok Agreement project and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation). The Bangkok Agreement,
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ﬁrst signed in 1975 and then upgraded in November 2005, is a partial scope
agreement between three Asia-Paciﬁc countries (China, Laos, South Korea) and
three South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka).1 The six countries
agreed to reduce tariffs from 1 July 2006 between them by an average of 30
percent, from 22 percent previously, and extend the agreement from 1,800 to
4,800 products, mostly in agricultural, textile and petrochemical sectors.2 This
new accord was renamed the Asia Paciﬁc Free Trade Area, which somewhat
overstated its scope both in geographic and trade liberalization terms. The
BIMSTEC arrangement is another plurilateral FTA project involving Asia-Paciﬁc
and South Asian states, ﬁrst established in 1997 between Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In 2004, four BIMSTEC
members – Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand – committed to abolish
tariffs between them by 2012, with the other, less developed members given
until 2017 to join the tariff-free arrangement.3 The inﬂuence of the region’s
bilateral FTA trend was relatively marginal here at best. Thailand had concluded
negotiations on a basic free trade agreement with India in October 2003, but its
implementation was long delayed because of unresolved disagreements over rules
of origin provisions. This will most likely be a difﬁcult area of negotiation in
both the BIMSTEC and Bangkok Agreement FTA projects as India in particular
prefers a different approach on rules of origin (change of tariff classiﬁcation and
value content modalities) than ASEAN states generally, which prefer a simpler
regional value content based approach.
2.4 Macro-Level Developments: ASEAN’s Integrational Projects
Layered on top of these various meso-level integrational projects at the sub-
regional level are three main ASEAN integrational projects at the macro-level,
1 The Bangkok Agreement was originally an initiative of the Economic and Social Commis-
sion for Asia and the Paciﬁc (ESCAP), and is Asia’s oldest preferential trade agreement. India,
Bangladesh, South Korea, Laos and Sri Lanka were the Bangkok Agreement’s founding members,
with China acceding in 2001.
2 Bloomberg News, 02 November 2005. More speciﬁcally, China offered tariff reductions on
1,697 product lines, India on 570, South Korea on 1,367, Sri Lanka on 427 and Bangladesh on
209.
3 Tariffs began to be reduced in mid-2006, with products designated for “fast track” treatment
to be traded on a zero-tariff basis by mid-2009 for the three developed members and by mid-2011
for the poorer members.
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that is involving the ASEAN group as a whole. These three projects are the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). There exists a considerable degree of
overlap or interlock between them as we shall discuss. Let us examine the basics
of each in turn.
2.4.1 The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
The idea for a regional free trade area in Southeast Asiawas ﬁrst formally proposed
by Singapore back in 1975 at the ﬁrst ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting but
other ASEAN member states such as Indonesia opposed the idea. A Preferential
Trade Arrangement (PTA) scheme was introduced in 1977 as a compromise
partial scope trade liberalization agreement but this achieved very little. By the
mid-1980s the PTA only affected at most 5 percent of intra-ASEAN trade.4 In
the context of ASEAN searching for a new geo-economic rationale in the post
Cold War era, the group decided at its 1992 summit to establish an ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008 (Nesadurai 2003).5 The main trade liberalization
mechanism of AFTA is the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme,
designed to reduce intra-ASEAN tariffs on trade in manufactures and processed
agricultural products. The process of CEPT liberalization has been a gradual
one, which began in the mid-1990s with the target date for core implementation
subsequently brought forward to 2003. With ASEAN enlargement into Indochina
during the latter 1990s, the new members of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam – the CLMV group – were given extended deadlines to implement their
AFTA commitments given the development gap that existed between them and
the incumbent ASEAN-6. The supplementary ASEAN Framework Agreement
on Services (AFAS) was introduced into the AFTA framework in 1995 and was
followed in 1998 by the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) scheme, which sought to
induce more FDI into region based on the idea that AFTA would create a more
integrated transnational space in which regional production networks could
operate more effectively.
4 At 1976 Bali Accord, when the PTA was originally signed, only 71 products eligible for treat-
ment, including infamously snow-ploughs and matchsticks. Singapore then wanted the Philippines
to go with it bilaterally at a faster pace but Indonesia and others opposed this as they argued it
undermine ASEAN unity.
5 Singapore was again the main advocate of AFTA, tabling the proposal at the 1992 summit.
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However, the 1997/98 ﬁnancial crisis severely tested the commitment of
certain ASEAN member states to fulﬁll their AFTA obligations, which prioritized
resolving acute domestic economic problems over implementing regional trade
liberalization (Kraft 2000; Rüland 2000; Stubbs 2000). This especially applied to
Indonesia and the Philippines, two of the largest ASEAN economies whose crisis-
induced economic and political turmoil was especially pronounced. Singapore’s
proposal in 1998 to accelerate the pace of AFTA trade liberalization – as embodied
in the Hanoi Plan of Action and Statement of Bold Measures – was opposed by
the Indonesian Government. Meanwhile, the Philippines Government expressed
concern over how the AFTA-induced loss of tariff revenue would signiﬁcantly
compromise its ﬁscal position. Both Indonesia and the Philippines unilaterally
delayed AFTA liberalization of their respective petrochemical trade regimes,6
to the particular annoyance of Singapore. In addition, tensions arose between
Malaysia and Thailand over the former’s decision to delay tariff reductions on
automotive product imports in the AFTA schedule by three years, from 2002
to 2005 (and even then, only to 20 per cent).7 Furthermore, not only did the
1997/98 ﬁnancial crisis lead many ASEAN states to drag their feet on AFTA trade
liberalization, but it also made AFTA itself a relatively less attractive commercial
proposition given the subsequent decline of the sub-region’s overall market
value: the prospects for foreign investors in, and exporters to, the sub-region
signiﬁcantly diminished since the crisis. This partly explains why Singapore and
Thailand from a comparatively early stage initiated bilateral FTA policies, in
some way compensating for AFTA downward-revised market potential.
2.4.2 Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI)
Trade integration projects such as AFTA tend to primarily beneﬁt more developed
economic zones within the trade area that are best able to exploit the new trade,
investment and other commercial opportunities presented by these projects. For
example, ﬁrms operating in Singapore or the Bangkok metropolitan region
in Thailand or the Kuala Lumpur district in Malaysia have the infrastructural
facilities, state technocratic support and the commercial experience and networks
to make much more of the new market openings arising from the AFTA. Such
6 The Economist, 06 November 2002.
7 Thailand hosts Southeast Asia’s biggest concentration of foreign investing automobile manu-
facturers.
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“core” zones of development within Southeast Asia were always more likely
to beneﬁt when compared to the region’s lesser developed “periphery” zones,
and from an ASEAN macro-perspective this especially concerns the CLMV
group. The Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), launched in November 2000,
was at least partly conceived as counteracting core-periphery divergence arising
from AFTA commercial liberalization. It drew in principle upon the European
integration experience whereby a periphery-serving regional policy (e.g. through
the Structural Fund process) was to ensure that weaker regions were better
empowered to take advantage of region-wide market liberalization. The IAI’s
primary objective was to bridge the development gap among ASEAN members
and is speciﬁcally focused on fostering intra-regional economic development and
co-operation through capacity-building and other measures.
The IAI framework developed through various stages. In July 2001, all
ASEAN member states signed the Hanoi Declaration On Narrowing Development
Gap For Closer ASEAN Integration8 and this was followed by the introduction
of the IAI Work Plan at the November 2002 summit convened at Phnom
Penh. Acknowledging that, “widening of the development gap between the
older ASEAN-6 members and the CLMV countries could undermine regional
solidarity”, this was a six-year program (2003-2008) primarily focused on the
CLMV countries but also the poorer sub-regions in the ASEAN-6 countries.
By February 2006, the IAI Work Plan had initiated 129 projects at various
stages of implementation9, which comprised 20 infrastructure projects (12
transport and eight energy projects), 48 human resource development (HRD)
projects, 20 information and communication technology (ICT) projects, 33
projects speciﬁcally for fostering regional economic integration and eight other
miscellaneous “general coverage” projects. Of the USD37 million funding secured
for the IAI Work Plan, the ASEAN-6 countries contributed almost USD21 million
(56 percent of the total) while 11 dialogue partner countries and development
agencies contributed the remaining USD16 million, the top ﬁve donors being
8 This committed ASEAN to “promote, through concerted efforts, effective co-operation and
mutual assistance to narrow the development gap among ASEAN member countries and between
ASEAN and the rest of the world for the sake of dynamic and sustained growth of our region and
prosperity of all our peoples.”
9 By this time, funding had been secured for 108 projects (83.7%), of which 66 projects had
been completed, 24 projects were being implemented, and 18 projects were in the planning stage.
Of the 21 un-funded projects, 4 have received partial funding commitment.
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South Korea, Japan, India, Norway and the EU.10 Table 1 shows that amongst the
ASEAN-6, Singapore was by far the biggest contributor here with USD15 million
committed to the IAI and Malaysia the second with just over USD3 million.11 In
addition, table 2 illustrates that on a bilateral basis the ASEAN-6 countries had
contributed USD159.4 million by this time to the CLMV countries to implement
various development projects, with Thailand making the largest contribution to
the tune of around USD100 million and Singapore second with USD52 million.
Table 1 ASEAN-6 Contribution to IAI Work Plan (at February 2006)
Country Funding Secured
(USD)
% Projects
Brunei Darussalam 1,500,000 7.2 5
Indonesia 599,000 2.9 5
Malaysia 3,245,814 15.6 45
Philippines 30,932 0.1 3
Singapore 14,979,121 72.1 11
Thailand 430,881 2.1 11
TOTAL 20,785,748 100.0 80
Source: Data provided by ASEAN Member Countries to the IAI Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat.
While these may look impressive ﬁgures in a relative sense within the group,
the development divide within Southeast Asia is such that these amounts are
unlikely to make a substantial difference. However, the IAI’s work on closing
development gaps within Southeast Asia is being augmented by the aid diplomacy
of Japan, China and European countries in particular, and also by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). As part of the Japan – ASEAN Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (JACEP), Japan has dedicated a fund of around USD4
billion to help narrow economic gaps among ASEAN states, enhancing the
competitiveness of ASEAN countries and strengthening co-operation between
10 These ﬁve accounted for around USD14 million, or 86 percent of funding by development
partners. It is interesting to note that the U.S. was not in this top ﬁve, indicative of the low
priority its foreign economic policy has afforded to Southeast Asian regional community-building
in general.
11 A proposal to establish an ASEAN Development Fund (ADF) to help further facilitate IAI
objectives emerged at the 2004 APT summit. A formal agreement on creating the ADF was signed
at Vientiane in July 2005 with each member state agreeing to contribute USD1 million initially.
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Japan and ASEAN on issues such as institutional and human capacity. China is
also trying to extend its inﬂuence through Indochina through its aid diplomacy.12
The ADB’s involvement with funding initiatives such as the Greater Mekong
Sub-region (GMS) project is also contributing to this process.
Table 2 ASEAN-6 Bilateral Contributions to the CLMV Group (at April 2005)
Country Number of Projects Cost of Project (USD) Date of
Implementation
Brunei Darussalam 4 358,605 15 Sep-15 Dec 2002
Indonesia 18 135,054 30 Jul 2000-23 Mar
2003
Malaysia 50 4,362,151 1992-Oct 2004
Philippines 31 261,8331 1995-7 Feb 2003
Singapore 9 52,495,275 2001-2008
Thailand 97 100,358,2552 1996-2004
TOTAL 209 157,971,173 1992-2008
Notes: 1 Only the amount of 7 projects out of the 31 projects is available; 2 Does not include
assistance in kind.
Source: Data provided by ASEAN Member Countries to the IAI Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat.
2.4.3 The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)
This idea for creating an ASEAN Economic Community has its roots in the 1998
Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA). Forged in the aftermath of the region’s 1997/98
ﬁnancial crisis, the HPA stated ASEAN’s intentions to enhance greater economic
and ﬁnancial co-operation amongst its member states as well as accelerate AFTA
progress towards implementation (Kraft 2000; Rüland 2000). In addition, the
HPA formally extended ASEAN regional economic and ﬁnancial co-operation
to the wider ASEAN Plus Three (APT) group (Mahani 2002). As the key
implementation deadlines for AFTA approached, the group looked towards
the next stage of regional economic integration. The AEC proposal originally
came from Singapore at the November 2002 ASEAN summit, and was later
co-sponsored by Thailand from January 2003. The AEC plan was formally
proposed at the 9th ASEAN Summit held at Bali, Indonesia in October 2003.
12 Research interview at the Singapore Institute for International Affairs, December 2004.
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This was later formulated into the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP), another
six-year plan that superseded the HPA and focused the AEC on achieving the
twin aims of narrowing the development divide within Southeast Asia – thus
intersecting with the IAI – and further deepening regional economic integration.
The latter objective envisaged the establishment of a single or common market
to promote the free ﬂow of goods, services, people and capital within Southeast
Asia. The AEC formed the “economic pillar” of a broader ASEAN Community
idea, the other two pillars being security and socio-cultural in nature. A deadline
was set to realize the AEC by 2020.
Although some parallels could be drawn with the EU’s Single European
Market project, the AEC does not aspire to the same level of integrational
ambition. For example, there would be no common external tariff (and hence
no customs union) established between ASEAN member states. The diversity of
development levels and trade policies (signiﬁcant tariff level variance) makes such
a goal difﬁcult. However, under the AEC eleven priority sectors are selected for
fast-track liberalization, namely agro-based products, air transport, automotive,
e-commerce, electronics, ﬁsheries, healthcare products, rubber-based products,
textiles and apparels, tourism and wood-based products. Furthermore, early
preparatory targets were set on a wide range of cross-sectional co-operative and
integrative measures.13 It was also originally agreed that a so called “ASEAN
minus x” approach be adopted in realizing AEC objectives, whereby all member
states were set a speciﬁc target to realize an objective but some members would
be permitted to implement at a slower pace to accommodate for development
asymmetry within the group (Cuyvers et al. 2005).
2.5 Overview
Regional economic integration in Southeast Asia faces many challenges as outlined
13 These included standardising custom costs and procedures, and harmonising technical regula-
tions across the region by the end of 2004; the elimination of identiﬁed NTBs from 2005; capital
controls must be progressively removed and intellectual property rights regimes strengthened,
including co-operation in exchange of copyright information to take effect in 2004; visa-free
travel for ASEAN nationals within the region by 2005; standardised requirements for professional
services to enable free movement of professional and skilled labour within ASEAN; accelerating
the implementation of mutual recognition arrangements for ﬁve priority sectors, these being elec-
trical and electronic equipment, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications equipment and
processed foods.
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in this section. Notwithstanding the expansion of regional production network
activity, intra-regional trade and investment ﬂows remain at quite low levels. Sub-
regional economic zone projects, while having ambitious aims, could be achieving
more in terms of advancing regionalization links within ASEAN. At the wider
macro-level, the AFTA project has faltered at times, especially in the aftermath
of the 1997/98 ﬁnancial crisis. The IAI project and other initiatives and measures
that aim to close development gaps in Southeast Asia are impeded by signiﬁcant
resource constraints. Despite these difﬁculties, these developments at the micro,
meso and macro levels inter-lock well with each other and generally work in
a congruent and mutually reinforcing manner in fostering regional community-
building. It therefore follows that other economic policy and diplomacy initiatives
must prove they are working in a similar fashion towards this objective.
3 Reconciling FTA Bilateralism with ASEAN Regionalism?
3.1 The Bilateral FTA Policies of Singapore and Thailand
The development of Singapore and Thailand’s bilateral FTA policies since the
late 1990s is constituent to a broader bilateral FTA trend that emerged across
the Asia-Paciﬁc from this time (Dent 2003, 2005, 2006). Free trade agreement
activity in the region had been hitherto somewhat limited with just seven FTAs
concluded by 1997, and none in East Asia or signed by an East Asian country with
any other (see ﬁgure 1). This changed dramatically thereafter, key catalytic events
being the 1997/98 East Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the December 1999 Seattle
WTO Ministerial Meeting debacle. The contagion-like spread of the ﬁnancial
crisis exposed both the extent to which regional economic interdependence
had developed between East Asian countries but also the lack of co-operative
mechanisms between them for coping with regional crises. Free trade agreements
and ﬁnancial co-operation agreements (through the APT process, such as the
Chiang Mai Initiative of bilateral currency swap accords) have been the main
vehicles for addressing this weakness. In the meantime, the Seattle debacle of
1999 caused many Asia-Paciﬁc states to consider FTAs as an insurance policy
based on expectations of a faltering multilateral trade system. Developments at
subsequent WTO Ministerials – especially Cancun in September 2003 – served
to reafﬁrm such pessimistic expectations. Moreover, the problems experienced
with advancing the AFTA and APEC liberalization agendas after the 1997/98
ﬁnancial crisis reinforced the will of Southeast Asia’s most pro-free trade member
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states, Singapore and Thailand, to look to FTAs as an alternative route.
Both Singapore and Thailand were at the forefront of the Asia-Paciﬁc’s
new FTA trend. Singapore is Southeast Asia’s most advanced economy and
its development strategy has been principally based on attracting increasingly
technology-intensive investments from foreign MNEs who use the city-state
as a platform from which to export to other markets in East Asia, and also
worldwide. Singapore’s position as a regional hub economy further extends to
its hosting of regional MNE headquarters and for the research, development
and design centre activity for foreign MNEs. Singapore is thus a key node in
regional and global circuits of capital. Securing FTAs with major trade partners
is part of the same strategy, as from the city-state foreign MNEs can export their
Singapore-assembled products tariff-free to a growing number of FTA partner
markets. Singapore has therefore always been a fervent advocate of free trade in
various levels and channels of economic diplomacy, e.g. regional, multilateral
(Daquila and Huy 2003; Desker 2004; Low 2003; Rajan et al. 2001). At the
1999 APEC summit, Singapore announced its intention to commence bilateral
FTA negotiations with Chile, Japan, Mexico and New Zealand. The ﬁrst of these
to be signed, the Agreement on a New Zealand – Singapore Closer Economic
Partnership (ANZSCEP) was the ﬁrst FTA concluded by an East Asian country.
A number of other agreements followed with Japan, the United States, Australia,
South Korea, Panama, Chile14 and China, as part of a wider ASEAN – China FTA.
Indeed, by the end of 2005 Singapore had concluded more bilateral FTA projects
with other Asia-Paciﬁc economies than any other in the region (see ﬁgure 2). In
addition, the city-state has signed FTAs with various trade partners worldwide
including India, Jordan and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) group.
Thailand has, like Singapore, shown a penchant for developing a broad
network of bilateral economic partnerships beyond Southeast Asia, and FTAs
have been a principal instrument of this strategy (Dent 2006b). In December 2000,
the Thai Government announced plans to explore FTA projects with a global
spread of trade partners. The strategic element of this partner selection process
was that many of them were core members of other regional trade arrangements:
India and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, Brazil and
Mercosur, South Africa and the South African Development Community, the
14 As part of the quadrilateral Trans-Paciﬁc Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEPA) with
Brunei and New Zealand.
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Figure 1 Asia-Paciﬁc FTA Projects (before 1998)
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Czech Republic and the Central European Free Trade Agreement, Bahrain
and the Gulf Co-operation Council, the United States and NAFTA (Nagai
2003). These bilateral FTA links are seen as bridgeheads into other global
regions, while bilateral FTAs with other East Asian states would help consolidate
Thailand’s position as an emerging national hub economy within ASEAN. There
are similarities here with Singapore’s broad geo-strategic approach in that bilateral
FTAs were viewed as a relatively quick and effective method to globalize Thai
economic diplomacy and diversify its market access interests. By 2005 it had
signed bilateral FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, China (ACFTA), Peru, India
and Bahrain, and was negotiating deals with Japan and the U.S. (see ﬁgure 2).
In the meantime, the only other ASEAN member states to have signed
individual FTAs with trade partners outside the region was Malaysia’s bilateral
with Japan (signed December 2005) and Brunei as a signatory to the quadrilateral
Trans-Paciﬁc Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEPA) agreement along with
Singapore, New Zealand and Chile. Other ASEAN member states – some of
them once overtly critical of Singapore and Thailand’s bilateral FTA policies as
we later discuss – joined the FTA trend relatively late. A number of bilateral FTA
negotiations were in progress (e.g. Malaysia – U.S., Indonesia – Japan) during
2006 but these member states lag well behind Singapore and Thailand.
3.2 The ASEAN Political Economy and FTAs
Singapore’s ardent pursuit of bilateral FTAs was in keeping with its reputation
for seeking new ways to advance Southeast Asia’s integrational ambitions, both
in intra-regional and extra-regional senses. Taking the intra-regional perspective
ﬁrst, it was previously noted that Singapore was AFTA’s earliest advocate from the
1970s and it was a Singaporean proposal that led to the project’s initiation in the
1990s. Along with Thailand, it has also frequently called for the 2020 deadline
of the AEC (another Singapore led proposal) to be brought forward by a few
years, most recently by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the May 2006 ASEAN
Economic Ministers Meeting although, like before, most other member states
did not support the idea. Over the last few years Singapore has sought a closer
relationship with Thailand as a like-minded bilateral partner within ASEAN
with which it could force the pace of integrational change in Southeast Asia.
This culminated in the Singapore – Thailand Enhanced Economic Relationship
(STEER) that was formally established in August 2003. At STEER’s launch,
Singapore and Thailand announced their intention to build a bilateral foundation
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Figure 2 Asia-Paciﬁc FTA Projects (by end of 2005)
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for greater economic integration within ASEAN based on a “one economy, two
countries” approach. Therein, both sides sought to strengthen their bilateral
economic co-operation, liberalization and integration across various ﬁelds.15
There were many politico-economic similarities and ties between Singapore
and Thailand. Both could be considered as corporatist states with a top-down
approach to policy-making and political governance. Their respective political
leaderships (the Thaksin and Lee families) also allegedly had close business ties
with each other,16 and the links between Singaporean and Thai business elites
were reported to be strong generally.17
STEER is a unique bilateral agreement within ASEAN and many other member
states have expressed some concern regarding its exclusive “AFTA-plus” nature.
This connects to the wider issue of how Singapore and Thailand’s so called
“pathﬁnding” approach to economic integration generally at the bilateral and
regional levels. It particularly relates to the “2 plus x” principle championed by
Singapore and Thailand in relation to ASEAN integration, whereby two member
states should be allowed to pioneer integration on a bilateral basis initially with
other members states open to join at a later date when ready. In a speech given
by Singapore’s Minister for Trade and Industry, George Yeo, around the time of
the October 2003 ASEAN Summit, he explained the “2 plus x” approach in these
Darwinesque terms: “it is better to catch up with those who are faster than to be
dragged back by those who are slower.” Furthermore, in acknowledgement to the
STEER framework, PM Thaksin suggested that Thailand and Singapore should
“tango” ﬁrst in this regard, thus advancing toward their AEC objectives ahead
of other ASEAN members. This ran somewhat counter to the aforementioned
“ASEAN minus x” approach that had been consensually agreed as the process
by which the AEC would be realized, whereby the emphasis lay more on group
consent and accommodating weaker members that was in contrast to the “2 plus
x” formula that allowed stronger pairs of members to surge ahead of the group.
While Singapore and Thailand have argued that their integrational ambitions
15 These included the automotive industry, electronics, agro-based products, air transport, trade
and investment promotion, healthcare, tourism, transport logistics, ﬁnancial services, information
and communication technology, small business formation, and mutual recognition agreements.
16 This was cited by many research interviewees from across Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand,
December 2004 (Singapore and Malaysia), July 2005 (Thailand).
17 For example, according to one research interviewee a number of high proﬁle Thai business
people are advisors to big Singaporean ﬁrms. Research interview, Bangkok, Thailand, July 2005.
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should not be constrained by the “convoy problem” of having to proceed at the
pace of slower member states, the “2 plus x” approach has not gained ground
within ASEAN. Many other ASEAN members believe it to be divisive by creating
a further tier within the group that is already stratiﬁed along ASEAN-6 and
CLMV sub-group layers.18
Nevertheless, Singapore and Thailand still continue to defend the Dar-
winesque logic of the “2 plus x” approach, and have applied its principle
to their bilateral FTA projects with countries outside the region: that is that
ASEAN members should be allowed to sign individual FTAs with others if they
are able, with others following on afterwards. When Singapore ﬁrst developed
its bilateral FTA policy, it drew much criticism from Malaysia in particular. There
were two main elements to this criticism. The ﬁrst concerned the technical
policy issue of how bilateral FTAs with extra-regional partners could possibly
undermine the integrity of AFTA. In February 2001, Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamed expressed concern about the trade deﬂection problem of
semi-ﬁnished products from bilateral FTA partners entering Singapore, then being
fully completed in the city-state and thereafter securing “back door”, zero-tariff
entry into the wider AFTA market.19 In reply, Singapore stated that the rules of
origin in its FTAs did not permit such trade deﬂection to occur, implying that
Singapore-made exports were sufﬁciently locally sourced to legitimately qualify
for access to the AFTA market.20 While this was correct in theory, it depended
upon the strictness of such rules and how effectively they were being applied.
Moreover, the second element to Malaysia’s criticism – the politico-economic
– was arguably more important than the ﬁrst. In an article published in the
New Straits Times in July 2001, former Malaysian Government minister, Ramon
Navaratnam, argued that, “Even if Singapore’s Free Trade Agreements are con-
sistent with AFTA and WTO, the real issue is whether Singapore’s unholy haste
is consistent with the ASEAN spirit of optimizing co-operation, consultation
and fraternal goodwill, in the longer term.”21 The broader point here is that
18 This view had been particularly expressed by Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Research
interviews in Jakarta, Indonesia and Bangkok, Thailand, July 2005.
19 Straits Times, 26 February 2001.
20 The CEPT programme dictates that AFTA-qualiﬁed products require a minimum of 40 per
cent ASEAN local content.
21 New Straits Times, 16 July 2001.
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bilateral FTAs could compromise the regional community-building purpose of
AFTA by focusing trade links and economic diplomacy efforts from inside the
region to outside it. This was notwithstanding, of course, Singapore’s efforts
to accelerate the pace of regional economic integration within Southeast Asia.
Malaysia soon had to capitulate, however, as other ASEAN states such as the
Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei also looked to initiate bilateral FTA policies
of their own by 2002. Soon thereafter, Malaysia felt compelled to join the new
FTA trend to avoid isolation, and proposed separate projects with Japan and the
U.S. by the end of that year.
Like Malaysia, other ASEAN member states were nevertheless somewhat
concerned about the effect Singapore’s and then Thailand’s bilateral FTAs would
have upon the ASEAN group. Many did understand Singapore’s motives given the
city-state’s extensive regional and global links, and thus how its FTA policy was a
function of its economy’s deep engagement in regionalization and globalization
processes. Indeed, Singapore argued that its FTAs with the U.S. and Japan in
particular would help draw higher levels of FDI into the city-state that in turn
would have positive externalities for other ASEAN member economies. This
would mostly be transmitted through the regional production network (RPN)
linkages and other mechanisms, such as the Integrated Sourcing Initiative (ISI)
arrangement in which goods produced on Indonesia’s Batam and Bintan Islands
industrial parks (which were originally established and still managed with the
help of Singaporean quasi-government agencies) would be eligible for tariff-free
entry into the U.S. under the terms of the U.S. – Singapore Free Trade Agreement
(USSFTA).22 Yet ASEAN level integration would be more ideal in this respect,
both intra-regionally (i.e. AFTA, AEC) and extra-regionally (e.g. ACFTA). It is
also rather ironic that Malaysia held out for so long against the bilateral FTA
trend because out of the rest of the ASEAN group (i.e. not including Singapore
and Thailand) it possessed by far the strongest technocratic, institutional and
industrial capacities required to initiate a bilateral FTA policy. Even middle-
order newly industrialized economies such as Indonesia and the Philippines face
signiﬁcant capacity constraints in doing so, an issue to which we later return.
22 There are around 700 foreign companies operating in the Batam Island industrial park,
70 percent of which are Singapore-based, and mostly involved in information technology and
electronics production as part of wider regional production networks operating in Southeast and
East Asia.
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While it looked as though the Singapore – Thailand alliance on ASEAN’s
integrational affairs and other matters was set to strengthen through the STEER
framework, fault-lines began to emerge in 2005 and 2006. Firstly, nothing of
much substance appeared from STEER related initiatives themselves, leading
some even with government circles to refer to it as simply a political marketing
exercise.23 At a more fundamental level, many believed the natural foundations
to a long-term Singapore – Thailand alliance were weak. Some contended that
Singapore’s more obvious bilateral “alliance” partner was Malaysia given the ex-
tensive commercial and ethnic ties as well as their geographic proximity.24 By the
same token, Thailand’s more natural politico-economic partners lay in Indochina,
such as Vietnam.25 Furthermore, others have noted that intensifying competition
rather than co-operation is the main deﬁning feature of Singapore – Thailand
relations. For example, regarding infrastructural competition, Thailand’s new
Bangkok airport project is challenging the position of Singapore’s Changi Airport
as Southeast Asia’s main regional air transportation hub.26 Furthermore, the
close links between the political leaderships of both countries, the Thaksin – Lee
axis, was placed under extreme duress as a consequence of the Shin Corp affair.
Shin Corp, Thailand’s largest telecommunications ﬁrm, was founded and 49.6
percent owned by Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra and his family. In January 2006,
it appeared that Shin Corp was being sold in a tax-free deal estimated at USD1.9
billion to Temasek Holdings, the Singapore government’s state investment arm
23 Research interview with Thai Ministry of Affairs ofﬁcial, July 2005.
24 However, relations between Singapore and Malaysia remain beset with disputes, such as
over freshwater supply contracts and infrastructural issues. The most recent of these concerns
Malaysia’s proposal in 2005 to replace the causeway linking the countries with a bridge, which
Singapore refusing to comply with citing the high costs of construction as a reason. Impatient with
the delay, Malaysia at one point decided to proceed with building its half of the bridge regardless of
whether Singapore built the other half or not. However, by April 2006 the Malaysian Government
announced it was scrapping its bridge building plan.
25 Research interviews with various government and research institute representatives, Southeast
Asia, December 2004 and July 2005.
26 In addition, Thailand’s Kra Isthmus canal project, which would cut through Malaysian penin-
sula and thus bypass Straits of Malacca, could if built undermine the strategic importance of
Singapore’s port complex and as a entrepot trade centre generally. However, this project is
technologically very difﬁcult for geological reasons (e.g. tides, shallow waters, ground height
differentials), but as an alternative Thailand is looking to construct an oil pipeline across the
narrowest point of the Isthmus to shorten the oil supply line from the Middle East to East Asia.
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that happened to be run by Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong’s wife, Ho Ching.
The public outcry in Thailand against both Singapore and the Thaksin Govern-
ment concerning the sale of an asset of such national strategic importance placed
considerable pressures upon the countries’ bilateral relationship.27
3.3 FTAs with the U.S., Japan and China
3.3.1 The U.S. – Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA)
Singapore’s FTA with the United States was the ﬁrst agreement of its kind the
U.S. had signed with an Asian country. The ﬁrst round of talks commenced in
December 2000 and the deal was concluded after 11 formal rounds in January
2003. In defense of the agreement and the preferential treatment it afforded
Singapore in the U.S. market, then PM Goh Chok Tong had tried to sell the
project to its Southeast Asian neighbors as further anchoring American interests
in their region, and that Singapore would not get any ﬁrst mover advantages.
Goh believed that the USSFTA would soon pave the way for the U.S. to sign
FTAs with many other ASEAN countries, especially since Washington advocated
the use of its Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) framework to facilitate this
on a bilateral basis. New bilateral FTA projects between the U.S. and selected
ASEAN countries, with Malaysia and the Philippines (both ﬁrst proposed in
October 2002), and Thailand (proposed in June 2003) but the development of
these projects have been difﬁcult. The main problem concerns the type or model
of FTA the United States presses for in negotiations, which can be a signiﬁcant
capacity challenge even for ASEAN’s advanced developing countries.28
When the U.S.’s FTA negotiators ﬁrst met with their Thai counterparts, they
reportedly presented them with the USSFTA text and informed them that this
was essentially the template they wanted to use for a U.S. – Thailand Free
Trade Agreement (USTFTA).29 Rather taken aback, the Thai negotiators rightly
reminded their American guests that each FTA was unique: a bespoke outcome
27 The Guardian, 24. March 2006.
28 This even applied to Singapore in certain respects. For example, a survey conducted by the
Singapore Business Federation found that many of the city-state’s smaller ﬁrms were experiencing
difﬁculties with understanding the USSFTA’s multitudinous product-speciﬁc rules of origin stipu-
lations. A government ‘outreach’ group was subsequently deployed to explain how to deal with
RoO aspects of the FTA. Research interviews with Singapore Business Federation and Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies representatives, Singapore, December 2004.
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from the particular politico-economic interactions between the trade partners
concerned. Thailand was not Singapore, and allowances had to be made for
this. Singapore government ofﬁcials themselves made the point that the USSFTA
possessed many “WTO-plus” elements, citing provisions on intellectual property
rights (IPR) that, for example, went beyond accords signed thus far at the WTO.30
While Singapore’s technocratic and institutional capacity was sufﬁciently robust to
accommodate American demands on IPR compliance, relatively weaker capacity
ASEAN did not enjoy the same “advantage”. Hence, when the U.S. reportedly
pressed Thailand to incorporate a 25-year period rule for enforcing drug patents
in its FTA negotiations with Thailand during 2005 (in doing so looking to extend
beyond the maximum 20-year period norm under WTO rules) as well as lift
restrictions on the market price of American pharmaceutical products, ﬁerce
opposition from various Thai civil society groups ensued.31 There was also public
concern that the U.S., as it usually did, would press Thailand into adopting core
elements of the U.S.’s national IPR regime (e.g. the 1998 Digital Millennium
Copyright and Copyright Term Extension Acts) that go well beyond the WTO’s
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement. At the same
time, the U.S. insisted on retaining a broad spread of protectionist barriers
on Thai agricultural and other products. Amidst a combination of technical
policy differences between Thai and American negotiators and domestic political
pressures, Thailand’s chief USTFTA negotiator resigned his position in January
2006.32 Two months later in March, the Thai government decided to put USTFTA
talks on hold owing to domestic political factors (an under pressure Thaksin
administration) and unresolved differences in the negotiations on IPR and other
issues.33
Learning from the experience of other Asia-Paciﬁc states that had entered into
FTA negotiations with the U.S., Malaysia had taken some time conducting a series
of cost-beneﬁt and feasibility studies on the impact such an agreement would have
upon the Malaysian economy. It was almost four years after a U.S. – Malaysia free
29 Research interviews with Thai government and research institute representatives, Bangkok,
July 2005.
30 Research interview with Singapore government ofﬁcials, December 2004.
31 Asia Times, 14 April 2005.
32 The Nation, 18 January 2006.
33 Reuters, 01 March 2006
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trade agreement (USMFTA) had ﬁrst been proposed that negotiations actually
commenced in June 2006. No doubt observing the difﬁculties experienced by
Singapore, Australia and Thailand in their FTA talks with the U.S., Malaysia
stated a month before USMFTA negotiations were due to start that it would
not rush the negotiation process, nor sign any deal that placed undue duress
upon the country’s development capacity. Meanwhile, as per usual practice,
the U.S. has pressed the Philippines to sign a trade and investment framework
agreement (TIFA) as a prerequisite to initiating bilateral FTA negotiations. A
TIFA is designed as a “capacity test” for prospective FTA partners for the U.S.,
evaluating whether the country concerned is able to comply with the “behind
the border” market access demands of American commerce. By mid-2006 the
Philippines had yet to sign a TIFA with the United States.
3.3.2 Dealing with Japan and China
Development assistance has long been a key aspect of the Japan – ASEAN
economic relationship. Southeast Asia was the recipient of between 30 to 40
percent of Japan’s total annual foreign aid budget. The expansion of Japanese
MNE activity in the region from the mid-1980s onwards further cemented the
relationship with Japan’s interests increasingly focused on improving the techno-
industrial capacity of local supplier ﬁrms that served of production networks of
the keiretsu. This emphasis on development co-operation was consistent with
Japan’s emerging approach to FTAs at the millennial eve, that is to embed trade
liberalization within a broader “economic partnership agreement” or EPA, and
was in contrast to the more overt neo-liberal approach adopted by the United
States where market access issues solely determined the FTA negotiating agenda.
The idea of establishing an FTA between Japan and ASEAN arose out of a broader
Japan – ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership (JACEP) agreement that
was ﬁrst proposed in January 2002 by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi,
and later signed in November that year. It is generally acknowledged that JACEP
was a quickly put together response to the ASEAN – China Framework Agreement
(containing an FTA element, ACFTA) that was signed in November 2001 with
a view to realize ACFTA by 2010 (Kagami 2003). However, it was not until
November 2004 that Japan and ASEAN formally decided to proceed with an
FTA element to JACEP, the ﬁrst round of negotiations taking place in April 2005.
By then, ACFTA talks had been more or less concluded.
There were interesting contrasts and similarities between both the nature and
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the process of the ACFTA and JACEP projects. In the nomenclature of both was
an expressed desire to advance regional economic co-operation in Southeast and
East Asia, with provisions focused on fostering co-operation in various ﬁelds
of endeavor, e.g. agriculture, education, ICT, science and technology, SME
development. If resources were forthcoming to help realize the development co-
operation objectives embodied by both agreements then this would certainly have
a positive effect on regional community-building. This was the most important
commonality between ACFTA and JACEP. Because China and ASEAN were both
essentially developing country trade partners, the ACFTA negotiating agenda was
relatively simpler and less complex than JACEP’s. Market access negotiations
in ACFTA primarily concerned goods trade liberalization and some services
trade liberalization (Tongzon 2005, Wong and Chan 2003). Furthermore, it
included simple generic rules of origin that were modeled on AFTA’s 40 percent
“regional value content” (RVC) approach. The relatively basic or lower common
denominator nature of ACFTA allowed ASEAN to negotiate with China as a
group. Singapore and Thailand had, though, pressed China to proceed bilaterally
to broker separate and more sophisticated deals in advance, and therein possibly
confer greater advantages over their fellow ASEAN members. However, Beijing
refused their requests. In contrast, FTA negotiations within JACEP have all been
conducted on a country-to-country bilateral basis. As Japan’s commercial and
regulatory interests are more complex than China’s (e.g. on “FTA plus” issues
such as IPR and investment rights), Tokyo insisted that only separate bilateral
negotiations would allow for the more ﬂexible approach required to meet those
interests, as well as take into account the development asymmetry of the ASEAN
group.34 ASEAN member states had at ﬁrst wanted to proceed on a group basis,35
as it had done with China, but eventually acquiesced to Japan’s demand, although
the idea was that common JACEP objectives were to be pursued through parallel
bilateral talks, e.g. on general trade liberalization, rules of origin regime, etc.
Thus, some degree of convergence and harmonization between these separate
bilateral deals was to be achieved as JACEP’s implementation deadline of 2012
approached.
Singapore had of course already signed a bilateral FTA with Japan (the JSEPA)
34 Research interview with Thai government ofﬁcials.
35 Research interviews with Thai, Malaysian and Indonesian government ofﬁcials, December
2004 and July 2005 in respective country capitals.
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and by 2006 Japan had initiated other bilateral negotiations with Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. However, a number of
problems soon became apparent with this bilateral approach. First, Japan was
able to play one ASEAN member state off against another, offering relative market
access advantages over other members to those more compliant to Tokyo’s wishes.
By not acting as a group and insisting on “most favored nation” (MFN, i.e. non-
discriminatory) treatment to be applied to all member states, ASEAN lost an
important negotiating advantage and moreover allowed competitive bilateralism
to prevail amongst the group. For example, Japan wanted to do different deals
on steel with different ASEAN states in accordance to the competitive threats
it faced from Southeast Asian countries in different steel sectors. Thailand
sought the Malaysian deal with Japan on steel (5 percent tariff maintained for
10 years) and prolonged negotiations ensued on this issue. In addition, tensions
between Malaysia and Thailand were further fuelled after Malaysia secured
their bilateral FTA with Japan well ahead of Thailand in May 2005, despite
them both commencing negotiations at the beginning of 2004.36 Many ASEAN
countries also felt that Japan was being unreasonable in certain areas of FTA
talks, for instance demanding that AFTA’s 40 percent RVC rules of origin apply
to its exports to Southeast Asia whereas ASEAN exporters had to comply with a
complex range of product-speciﬁc rules when exporting to Japan.37
While most ASEAN member states had resisted such demands by Tokyo, there
was virtually no co-ordination between them in their separate bilateral FTA talks
with Japan.38 This ran counter to the principle of regional unity and also posed
a problem for harmonizing and converging the bilaterals into a common JACEP
framework.39 The JACEP plan was that Japan’s bilateral FTAs with ASEAN
36 E-Sinchew-i.com News, 27 May 2005.
37 Research interview with Thai FTA negotiator, Bangkok, July 2005.
38 There was reportedly some exchange of information amongst ASEAN member states but most
research interviewed government ofﬁcials conceded not a great deal. For instance, the Philippines
and Malaysia did share some details with other members about their bilateral talks with Japan,
mainly on concessions made on agriculture and automotive sector products. Research interviews
with government ofﬁcials in Kuala Lumpur (December 2004) and Jakarta (July 2005).
39 In ACFTA negotiations, the ASEAN Secretariat acted as a coordinating agent between rounds
of talks, sending off mutually endorsed papers from ASEAN for China to look at. This was the
general framework of talks but there were also speciﬁc sectors that were dealt with more on a
bilateral or sub-group basis. Research interviews with ASEAN Secretariat representatives, Jakarta,
July 2005.
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should all be in place by 2007 leaving another ﬁve years to merge them into
one Japan – ASEAN arrangement by 2012. An interviewed Thai Ministry of
Commerce remarked, however, that harmonizing the different bilateral RoO
and tariff liberalization schedules of separate bilaterals into one ASEAN level
agreement would be “a headache” and FTA negotiators from all sides were still
not sure how this will be achieved.40 Overall, there appears to be a general view
amongst research interviewed ASEAN government ofﬁcials that Japan was a far
more difﬁcult FTA negotiator than China.41 Whatever the case, the bilateral
approach to FTA negotiation proved the more divisive and was seen by most to
work against regional community-building in Southeast and East Asia. Learning
lessons from this, ASEAN convinced South Korea to negotiate on a group basis
with its own FTA negotiations.
4 Capacity Issues and Development Assistance
The ability of developing countries to negotiate an FTA that suits their economic
interests, effectively implement the agreement’s provisions, and also successfully
exploit the commercial opportunities arising from the agreement ultimately
depends on their capacity to achieve these ends (UNCTAD 2004). This is
more critically the case for bilateral FTAs because developing countries cannot
necessarily rely on their fellow regional group members (e.g. AFTA and ASEAN)
for capacity assistance as such. By “capacity” we are referring to the various
development-related functions of the nation concerned, primarily comprising:
• Technocratic capacity: the quality and quantity of the nation’s technocrats,
either directly employed by or seconded to the government, that can be drawn
upon to develop FTA projects (e.g. as negotiators or study analysts) and a
robust FTA policy generally.
• Industrial capacity: the ability of the economy’s industrial sectors to expand
operations in newly created FTA markets, and therein undertake necessary
structural adjustments required to compete effectively within those markets.
• Institutional capacity: the ability of the nation’s institutional frameworks
(e.g. legal, socio-cultural) to accommodate the various policy-related commit-
40 Research interview, Bangkok, July 2005.
41 An additional reason for this not mentioned thus far were the inter-ministerial conﬂicts
that beset the Japanese government when negotiating with any trade partner, especially over
agricultural trade.
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ments incorporated into the FTA, such as on intellectual property rights and
competition policy. Examples of “institutions” in this sense mainly relate to
agencies (e.g. anti-trust regulators, patent regulators) and associated laws and
rules devised to enforce legislation once enacted.
Most ASEAN member states face capacity constraints when developing an
FTA policy, but some much more than others. Only Vietnam from the CLMV
group has sufﬁcient capacity to develop some kind of FTA policy, and from early
2006 began preliminary bilateral talks with Japan – its very ﬁrst project. Yet
even Vo Tri Thanh, Director of the Vietnam Government’s Department for Trade
Policy and International Integration Studies commented at the time, “I think
that with the limited staff it currently has, it would be very difﬁcult for Vietnam
to conduct quality negotiations.”42 As previously noted, middle-order NIEs like
Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei have too experienced real difﬁculties in
initiating their own bilateral FTA policies. For example, in their report published
by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Medalla and Lazaro (2004)
argued that the country had a weak technocratic and institutional framework for
developing and negotiating FTA projects, and that the Philippines had appeared
more of a passive negotiator or participant in its FTA projects. Not only did the
country suffer from having only a small pool of sufﬁciently skilled and technically
trained FTA negotiators but also public regulations on issues such as IPR and
quarantine lacked the robustness demanded by more developed FTA partner
countries, like the U.S., Japan and Australia. Medalla and Lazaro (2004) also
noted that the government has no concrete strategies or well deﬁned policies
toward FTAs. It was their view that the government had not sufﬁciently mapped
out industry-by-industry adjustment and competitiveness strategies with industry
leaders so as to maximize the potential commercial beneﬁts of FTAs for the
economy. The author’s own research also indicated that Indonesia faces very
similar capacity challenges.43 Furthermore, a research interviewed Indonesian
42 VietNamNet, 13 March 2006.
43 Field research conducted in Jakarta, July 2005. To illustrate this point further, an interviewed
research analyst involved in ACFTA impact studies made the following observations in relation
to capacity differentiation within ASEAN: “Malaysia was not sure how far it wanted to proceed
in the early rounds of talks and the Philippines was also tentative, sending different negotiating
teams for each round and citing problems with civil society back home in order to delay progress
a little. The Indonesian team never said that much. Myanmar wanted a lot of special treatment.
Cambodia and Laos did not say anything and Brunei was very quiet. Vietnam sent young but
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government ofﬁcial was of the view that Singapore’s “WTO plus” approach
to FTAs is not that helpful to developing countries because they set too high
a standard and precedents (e.g. on IPR) that countries with much weaker
technocratic and institutional capacity ﬁnd hard to comply with.44 This issue was
discussed earlier in relation to the USSFTA.
The profusion of bilateral FTAs developed by ASEAN’s stronger member
states risks exacerbating the development divide in Southeast Asia, and therein
work counter to the regional community-building efforts of the sub-region and
region-wide integrational projects discussed earlier, e.g. ACMECS, AFTA, IAI.
This is primarily because the more advanced developing countries like Singapore,
Thailand and Malaysia (i.e. the ASEAN “core-zone” economies) have stronger
export industry capacities than their less advanced “periphery-zone” counterparts.
Thus, FTA conferred preferential access to developed country markets will spur
the export-led growth rate of the former yet further ahead of the latter, thus
prospectively leading to greater divergence in income levels between the region’s
states generally. There are additional economic beneﬁts that will accrue to
core-zone countries from enjoying closer commercial ties with signiﬁcant trade
partners through FTAs, such as increased levels of foreign direct investment and
technology transfer.
The development divide problem exacerbated by bilateral FTAs can be ad-
dressed by compensating measures to improve the economic capacity of ASEAN’s
lesser developed members, this being over and above what is already being
planned within the IAI framework in relation to regional market integration
schemes such as AFTA and AEC. However, these additional compensating mea-
sures have not been forthcoming. Singapore government ofﬁcials have acted as
“FTA tutors” to their ASEAN counterparts when asked, sharing their knowledge
and experiences of negotiating FTAs with others. Singapore and Thailand also
have development assistance policies in which lesser-developed ASEAN countries
are beneﬁciaries. Thailand’s policy is centered on aforementioned sub-regional
projects, especially the ACMECS and GMS. Obtaining data on Singapore’s aid
policy is notoriously difﬁcult but there is a strong emphasis on conferring techni-
talented negotiators and demanded a lot. Singapore was proactive and wrote things up because
they had the best English and were the most technocratically skilled. Thailand also sent a strong
team and was the lead negotiator in the early rounds.” Research interview, Bangkok, July 2005.
44 Research interview, Jakarta, July 2005.
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cal assistance rather than ﬁnancial assistance to its recipients (Dent 2002). The
main reason given for this is that technical assistance is non-corruptible whereas
ﬁnancial assistance is open to corruption in the receiving country. Despite this
argument, the CLMV countries have called upon Singapore to be more generous
with its aid policy, especially given the huge ﬁnancial surpluses the city-state has
at its disposal. It was previously established that Singapore has made signiﬁcant
contributions to the CLMV group relative to other ASEAN member states, but
relative to the city-state’s ﬁnancial resources these are comparatively very small
indeed.45 Furthermore, the more advanced members of ASEAN need to afford
more priority to attracting higher levels of development assistance from outside
the region. We have already noted the importance of Japan’s contributions in this
regard, and the development co-operation dimension to its preferred “economic
partnership” approach to FTAs. ASEAN member states should ensure that Tokyo
makes good on promises made regarding the latter and that there is real substance
to development co-operation provisions negotiated in JACEP outcomes.
5 ASEAN Economic Integration and Bilateral FTAs: Pulling in
Opposite Directions?
Before summarizing the main arguments of this paper, we should restate that
free trade agreements are heterogeneous entities and can vary signiﬁcantly in
terms of technical policy content, underlying philosophical approach, number
of partners involved (e.g. bilateral, plurilateral, regional) and so on. Figure
1 illustrates this generically with regard to thematic content variance in Asia-
Paciﬁc FTAs and ﬁgure 2 speciﬁcally concerning different rules of origin regimes.
Region-level (e.g. ACFTA, AFTA) FTAs are most likely to positively contribute
to regional community-building in Southeast Asia simply because they are based
on the principles of inclusion and equity of interest, as should be reﬂected in the
negotiation process and the ﬁnal agreement itself. Further regional community-
building value is added when such agreements incorporate, or are combined
with, development co-operation measures aimed at enhancing the technocratic,
institutional and industrial capacities of “periphery-zone” countries within the
region, in Southeast Asia’s case mainly the CLMV group. Development gaps
45 For example, when compared to the USD100 billion of foreign exchange reserves managed by
the Singapore state’s Government Investment Corporation. Singapore is around the ﬁfth largest
retainer of such reserves in the world, and the world’s highest in per capita terms.
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within ASEAN are already being addressed by macro-level projects like the
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) as well as to a lesser extent meso-level
projects such as ACMECS. However, these require more substantive support
from Southeast Asia’s main economic partners to make a real difference, and in
the meantime FTAs must not work counter to the objectives of these projects.
This paper has argued that bilateral FTAs pose the most signiﬁcant risks in this
regard.
Bilateral FTAs signed by Southeast Asia’s strongest economic powers will have
some positive regionalization effects, especially when they involve Singapore
and Thailand, the region’s two most important hub economies. Nevertheless,
these hub “core” economies will still beneﬁt by far the most in the economic
geography context from FTA-induced rises in export-led growth and inward
foreign investment. Multi-level economic integration is the reality in Southeast
Asia, yet bilateral FTAs could signiﬁcantly exacerbate the development divide in
the region. Even when developed countries like Japan incorporate development
assistance measures within their free trade / economic partnership agreements,
these have been to date directed towards stronger ASEAN economies ahead of
weaker countries because the latter face signiﬁcant capacity constraints in opera-
tionalizing a bilateral FTA policy. We have noted how the capacity constraint
issue and bilateral FTAs has a number of dimensions to it. Developed coun-
try partners are already making heavy demands upon the capacity functions of
ASEAN member states in many areas (e.g. IPR compliance) through bilateral FTA
negotiations. This can incur relatively high costs on Southeast Asian countries
and even damage their development prospects. For example, in USTFTA talks
the U.S. insisted that Thailand open up its infant e-banking industry to the might
of American competition.46 Weaker developing countries are at a far greater tech-
nocratic capacity disadvantage in bilateral negotiations with developed countries
when compared to dealing with them in plurilateral negotiations (e.g. regional,
multilateral) because the relational power advantage of developed countries is
circumscribed by the collective membership in plurilateral frameworks. Bilateral
FTAs only serve to reinforce existing power asymmetries between developed and
developing countries, especially where the developed country demonstrates far
less interest in providing development capacity assistance to its weaker partner,
46 The Nation, 22 September 2005.
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the U.S. being particularly culpable here.
As we have also discussed, the competitive bilateralism arising amongst ASEAN
member states as they individually pursue FTAs with extra-regional partners
can undermine the regional community-building process. It is better to proceed
on a consensual “most favored nation” basis in such circumstances, whereby a
concession won by one ASEAN country with an FTA partner is then extended to
all others on an equal, non-discriminatory basis, yet this is not happening. In the
further interest of upholding Southeast Asia’s regional solidarity, if Singapore and
Thailand continue advocating the economic Darwinesque approach to ASEAN
economic integration and bilateral FTAs – allowing stronger member economies
to exert competitive disciplines upon the rest of the group – then they should
concomitantly be doing more (especially the ﬁnancial resource-rich Singapore) to
enhance the development capacity of Southeast Asia’s periphery zone countries,
devoting their considerable economic diplomacy skills increasingly to these ends.
International market liberalization and integration are useful mechanisms for im-
proving economic efﬁciency and welfare but weaker participating economies must
be capacity empowered to more effectively exploit the according opportunities
presented within this dynamic economic region.
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